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THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT OF
1976: GIVING THE PIANTFF HIS DAY IN COURT
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 21, 1977, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (Act)
went into effect.' The Act is the result of several years of patient effort
2
jointly undertaken by the Departments of State and Justice in collaboration
with the practicing bar.3 It is essentially a codification of the existing law
governing suits involving foreign states in United States courts.4
The Act sets forth the "sole and exclusive standards to be used in resolving
1. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat 2891 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2), (4).
1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (West Supp. 1977)).
2. In 1973, similar legislation was introduced in Congress. This legislation was withdrawn for
reconsideration. See S. 566, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 3493, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
Hearings were held on June 7, 1973, before a subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee.
Immunities of Foreign States: Hearing on H.R. 3493 Before the Subeomm. on Claims and
Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). For
an analysis of the earlier legislation, see Sklaver, Sovereign Immunity In the United States: An
Analysis of S. 566, 8 Int'l Law. 408 (1974). The Immunities Act is in many respects similar to the
earlier proposed legislation. Certain commentary on the earlier legislation is. therefore, relevant
in analyzing the Immunities Act of 1976.
3. Statement by the Int'l Law and Transactions Div. of the D.C. Bar, reprinted in
Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearings on H.R. 11315 Before the
Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 Hearings].
4. The Immunities Act defines foreign state to include the foreign state itself, its political
subdivisions, and its agencies or instrumentalities. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1603(a) (West Supp. 1977). The
term political subdivisions includes "all governmental units beneath the central government,
including local governments." H.L Rep. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1976]
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6604, 6613 [hereinafter cited as House Report, with page numbers
as reprinted]. An agency or instrumentality of a foreign state is any entity. (1) which has a
separate legal existence apart from the state, such that it can sue or be sued in its own name; (2)
which is an organ of a foreign state or a majority of whose shares are owned by a foreign state;
and (3) which is neither a citizen of the United States nor created under the laws of any third
country. Id. at 6613-14. Thus, for example, a corporation which was organized and doing
business pursuant to the laws of New York was found not to be an agency of a foreign state,
despite the fact that a majority of its shares was owned by the Soviet Government. Amtorg
Trading Corp. v. United States, 71 F.2d 524, 529 (C.C.P.A. 1934). An entity of a foreign state
created under the laws of a third country is presumptively engaging in private commercial
activity and is treated as any private entity. House Report, supra at 6614.
The Act, in several respects, offers those involved in litigation with an agency or instrumental-
ity of a foreign state certain fundamental procedural advantages as compared to those procedures
available in litigation involving a foreign state or its political subdivisions. Compare 28 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1608(a), 1608(b) (West Supp. 1977) with id. §§ 1610(a), 1610(b). See also notes 156-68 &
186-207 infra and accompanying text. "The rationale for the difference in treatment is that each
agency or instrumentality will probably have its own assets and will act as a separate entity,
analogous to an American corporation." Sklaver, Sovereign Immunity in the United States: An
Analysis of S. 566, 8 Int'l Law. 408, 422 (1974) (note that Sklaver's analysis was of the earlier
proposed legislation).
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questions of sovereign immunity raised.., before Federal and State courts." 5
Its general purpose is "to facilitate and depoliticize litigation against foreign
states and to minimize irritations in foreign relations arising out of such
litigation."' 6 It assures that citizens entering into commercial transactions with
foreign states will not be deprived of legal redress. 7 The rationale is that a
foreign state that chooses to engage in commercial activities should bear the
cost of doing business, including litigation.8
This Note will examine the provisions of the Act with particular emphasis
given to an analysis of its interaction with prior case law. As a preliminary
matter, it should be noted that the Act does not affect substantive rules of
liability. Its main thrust is a codification of the procedural rules to be applied
in litigation involving foreign states. Consequently, this analysis will concen-
trate on the procedural aspects of the Act.
II. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN UNITED
STATES COURTS
The traditional rule regarding the sovereign immunity afforded a foreign
state9 in United States courts was articulated by Chief Justice Marshall in
Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon,10 in which citizens of the United States
had libeled an armed vessel in the possession of Napoleon's navy. The citizens
claimed that the vessel had been wrongfully taken and converted into a war
vessel. The Supreme Court dismissed the action and ordered the vessel
released.' Marshall stated the rule as follows:
5. House Report, supra note 4, at 6610.
6. Letter from Robert S. Ingersoll, Deputy Secretar) of State, and Harold R. Tyler, Jr.,
Deputy Attorney General, to Hon. Carl 0. Albert, Speaker of the House of Representatives (Oct.
31, 1975), reprinted in House Report, supra note 4, at 6634.
7. 1976 Hearings, supra note 3, at 24 (testimony of Monroe Leigh accompanied by Michael
Sandier). "At the heart of the bill are some modern-day realities. Increasingly, our citizens...
[are coming] into contact with foreign governments and their agencies." Id. "[Tihis bill Is
important because of the increasing tendency of governments abroad to conduct foreign business
through state trading organizations, state-owned corporations, or directly through government
ministries. . . . In the resource area, state-owned firms now predominate in the oil field ...
National agricultural marketing boards are playing an increasing direct role in grain trade; in
shipping, many developing countries are buying national fleets which are operated as state
monopolies; and, of course, most international airlines have long been state-controlled entities.
"States are also becoming involved in the creation of industrial conglomerates which buy, sell,
and invest in the U.S ..... " Letter from Timothy W. Stanley, President, International Economic
Policy Association, to Hon. Walter Flowers, Chairman, Subcomm. on Administrative Law and
Governmental Relations, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S House of Representatives (June 24,
1976), reprinted in 1976 Hearings, supra note 3, at 71.
8. See Panel, Litigating the Immunity of Foreign Sovereigns: Selected Problems of Presenting
Your Case in the Courts and the Executive Branch, 1976 Proc. Am. Soc'y Int'l L. 41, 58 (remarks
of Mr. Sandier) [hereinafter cited as Litigating].
9. "Sovereign immunity is a doctrine of international law under which domestic courts, in
appropriate cases, relinquish jurisdiction over a foreign state." House Report, supra note 4, at
6606.
10. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
11. Id. at 146-47. As a corollary to the principle of sovereign immunity, a rule developed that
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One sovereign being in no respect amenable to another, and being bound by obliga-
tions of the highest character not to degrade the dignity of his nation, by placing
himself or its sovereign rights within the jurisdiction of another, can be supposed to
enter a foreign territory only under an express license, or in the confidence that the
immunities belonging to his independent sovereign station, though not expressly
stipulated, are reserved by implication, and will be extended to him.1-
Under this theory of sovereign immunity, a foreign sovereign was considered
absolutely immune from suit without its consent.
13
At the turn of the century, as the number of commercial contracts between
states increased, a new "restrictive" theory of sovereign immunity began to
emerge1 4 which recognized immunity with regard to the sovereign or public
acts of a foreign state but not with respect to its private acts. Is In contrast to
the absolute immunity theory, in which every act of a foreign state was
considered a sovereign act, the restrictive immunity theory was based upon
the principle that a foreign state could engage in an entire panoply of ac-
tivities without donning the cloak of sovereignty. Implicit in this limited
recognition was the notion that a foreign state was not bound to confine itself
the property of a foreign state was immune from arrest or detention under judicial process. While
Schooner Exchange dealt specifically with military property of a foreign state, the rule was
extended to commercial property in Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 567 (1926). In
Berizzi, the Supreme Court held that a merchant vessel owned and operated by a foreign state
was immune from arrest under process based on libel in rem brought by a private citizen. But see
Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945), discussed at notes 93-96 infra and
accompanying text.
12. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 137.
13. The United States thus joined the majority of nations adhering to the absolute immunity
concept. The British courts expressed the rule in equally broad terms: "As a consequence of the
absolute independence of every sovereign authority, and of the international comity which
induces every sovereign state to respect the independence and dignity of every other sovereign
state, each and every one declines to exercise by means of its courts any of its territorial
jurisdiction over the person of any sovereign . . . ." J. Sweeney, The International Law of
Sovereign Immunity 20 (1963) (quoting the Parliment Beige, 5 P.D. 197. 217 (1880)). However.
even under the absolute theory of sovereign immunity, the immunity of a state from judicial
process did not extend to litigation regarding a determination of an interest in immovable or real
property located in the territory of another state. Id. at i. The Act continues this rule. See 28
U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(4) (West Supp.'1977).
14. The restrictive theory of sovereign immunity "ha[d] become necessary because States
increasingly exercise activities in the realm of... trade." Sweeney, supra note 13, at 37, (quoting
Republic of Latvia Case, 221 I.L.R1 230, 231 (,V. Ger. KGE, Berlin 1955)). It is interesting to
note, however, that the development of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity had been
foreshadowed as early as Schooner Exchange where Justice Marshall stated: "A prince, by
acquiring private property in a foreign country, may possibly be considered as subjecting that
property to the territorial jurisdiction; he may be considered as so far laying down the prince, and
assuming the character of a private individual . . . ." 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 145.
15. For a discussion of the distinction between public and private acts, see Letter from Jack
B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor of the Department of State, to Philip B. Perlman, Acting Attorney
General (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 Dep't State Bull. 984 (1952). See also Lauterpacht, The
Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States, 28 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 220 (1951);
Sweeney, supra note 13, at 20-23.
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to a political role and could buy, own, contract, become creditor or debtor,
and engage in commerce. As to these activities the state was acting as a
private person, and under the restrictive theory, the foreign state as a civil
person was amenable to the courts. 16 Thus, under the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity, when a foreign state entered the marketplace as a
merchant, it was held accountable for its commercial obligations.' 7 Even
Chief Justice Marshall, otherwise an adherent of the absolute theory of
sovereign immunity, had recognized "that when a government becomes a
partner in any trading company, it divests itself. . . of its sovereign character,
and takes that of a private citizen."' 8 However, while this restrictive theory
correctly reflected economic reality, it was difficult to apply in practice.
Indeed, the conceptual difficulties involved in differentiating between the
public and private acts of a sovereign led many commentators to declare that
the restrictive theory of immunity was unworkable.' 9 Courts struggling to
apply these distinctions reached completely inconsistent results. For example,
in Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece, Ministry of Commerce,
Purchase Directorate,2 0 the Second Circuit held that a contract entered into
by Greece's Ministry of Commerce for the purchase and shipment of grain
was a non-immunized commercial act. On the other hand, in Isbrandtsen
Tankers, Inc. v. President of India,2 ' the same court upheld India's defense of
sovereign immunity in an action arising out of a contract for grain shipments
similar to those in Petrol Shipping. In Et Ve Balik Kurumu v. B.N.S.
International Sales Corp. ,22 plaintiff, a state enterprise of the Republic of
Turkey, whose duty included supplying meat and fish to the Turkish army,
had contracted for the purchase of mutton. A dispute arose and the court held
that the plaintiffs acts constituted a commercial activity not immune from
16. Sweeney, supra note 13, at 20-21 (quoting Soci~t6 Anonyme des Chemins dc Fer Libgcois
Luxembourgeois v. The Netherlands, Supreme Court, Belgium, [1903] Pas. 1, 294, 301).
17. See 1976 Hearings, supra note 3, at 30. This concept was recently reiterated by the
Supreme Court: "When a state enters the market place seeking customers it divests itself of its
quasi sovereignty pro tanto, and takes on the character of a trader. . . ." Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 696 (1976) (quoting Ohio v. Helvering, 292
U.S. 360, 369 (1934)).
18. Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904, 907 (1824).
19. Victory Transp. Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d
354, 360 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
20. 360 F.2d 103 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 931 (1966.r
21. 446 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971)."sbrandtsen Tankers may be
distinguished from Petrol Shipping in that in Isbrandtsen Tankers the court deferred to a State
Department suggestion of immunity filed with the court. (For a discussion of the effect of these
"suggestions," see notes 25-31 infra and accompanying text). However, the court did state that
even in the absence of a State Department suggestion, "the mere fact that a contract with a
private commercial interest is involved does not automatbcally render the acts of the foreign
government private and commercial." Id. at 1200. Such a statement seems clearly at variance
with the result in Petrol Shipping. See also Victory Transp. Inc. v. Comisaria General de
Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).




defendant's counterclaims. However, another court, in Kingdom of Roumania
v. Guaranty Trust Co. 23 reached the opposite conclusion. There, a foreign
state, which had entered into a contract in the United States to purchase shoes
for its army, was allowed a sovereign immunity defense, because the transac-
tion constituted a public act.
In the United States, the difficulties encountered in the application of the
resrictive theory were compounded by a unique practice which had devel-
oped with respect to the adjudication of sovereign immunity claims. Spe-
cifically, in actions against foreign states in United States courts, the foreign
state had the option of either litigating the defense of sovereign immunity in
court 24 or making a formal diplomatic request to the State Department to
"suggest" to the court that the proceeding be dismissed on the ground of
sovereign immunity.2 S
The courts conclusively accepted these State Department "suggestions"
without questioning their fairness or wisdom. 26 The germination of this
"practice of granting unquestioned discretion"2 7 to these suggestions may be
seen in Schooner Exchange28 where Chief Justice Marshall stated that "there
seems to be a necessity for admitting that the fact [of immunity] might be
disclosed to the court by the suggestion of the attorney for the United
States." 29 Despite vigorous debate over the propriety of the State Department
role, 30 the courts continued their unquestioned acceptance of State Depart-
23. 250 F. 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 246 U.S. 663 (1918).
24. See Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945). See also 1976 Hearings, supra
note 3, at 26 (testimony of Monroe Leigh accompanied by Michael Sandier),
25. See Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943); Rich v. Naviera Vacuba S.A., 295
F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961).
26. Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 599 (1943). See also Rich v. Naviera Vacuba
S.A., 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961); Irving Trust Co. v. The Maliakos, 41 F. Supp. 697 (S.D.N.Y.
1941); Chemical Natural Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Venezuela, 420 Pa. 134, 215 A2d 864,
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 822 (1966). To the extent that litigation involving a foreign state was
viewed as relating to the conduct of foreign relations, the judicial adherence to State Department
suggestions may have been justified under the political question doctrine. "The conduct of the
foreign relations of our Government is committed by the Constitution to the Executive and
Legislative--2the political'--Departments of the Government, and the propriety of what may be
done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision." Oetjen v.
Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918). See generally Dickinson, The Law ofNations as
National Law: "Political Questions," 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 451 (1956).
27. Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614, 617 (5th Cir. 1974).
28. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
29. Id. at 147.
30. See generally Cardozo, Judicial Deference to State Department Suggestions: Recognition
of Prerogative or Abdication to Usurper?, 48 Cornell L.Q. 461 (1963); Dickinson, The Law of
Nations as National Law: "Political Questions," 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 451 (1956); Jessup, Has the
Supreme Court Abdicated One ofIts Functions?, 40 Am. J. Int'l L. 168 (1946); Lowenfeld, Claims
Against Foreign States-A Proposal for Reform of United States Law, 44 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 901




ment suggestions in order to avoid embarrassing the executive arm of the
government in the conduct of foreign policy. 3'
Even where the foreign state chose to litigate the defense of sovereign
immunity, judicial deference to State Department policy continued. In Repub-
lic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 32 the Supreme Court declined to recognize a claim
of immunity where the State Department had refused to suggest that the
action be dismissed on the ground of sovereign immunity. The Court stated
that "[i]t is... not for the courts to deny an immunity which our government
has seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity on new grounds which the
government has not seen fit to recognize."
33
In 1952, the State Department, in the Tate Letter, 34 officially adopted the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity by announcing that "the Department
feels that the widespread and increasing practice on the part of governments
of engaging in commercial activities makes necessary a practice which will
enable persons doing business with them to have their rights determined in
the courts. '35 Theoretically therefore, in cases involving claims arising out of
the commercial transactions of a foreign state, the State Department- would
decline to suggest that the action be dismissed. However, notwithstanding
adoption of the Tate letter, the State Department, as an essentially political
body, often succumbed to the daily exigencies of political pressure exerted by
foreign states and issued State Department suggestions in return for conces-
sions or political trade-offs on the foreign relations front. 36 This occurred even
where the claims involved arose out of what were arguably commercial
activities of a foreign state.
Illustrative of this is Rich v. Naviera Vacuba S.A. 7 in which various
United States judgment creditors of Cuba sought to attach a Cuban merchant
vessel. The claims involved arose out of the commercial activities of Cuba.
The State Department, in an action completely inconsistent with the policies
31. Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Embassy of South Vietnam, 275 F. Supp. 860, 861 (S.D.N.Y.
1967). However, one commentator, expressing his dissatisfaction with justifying judicial defer-
ence to Department suggestions on the basis of potential embarrassment to the Executive, stated
that this is " 'one of the most overrated arguments in the annals of American legal history.' It
would be useful if someone would list the cases in which court action has embarrassed the
Executive Branch in any significant way in the conduct of foreign affairs." Panel, New
Departures in the Law of Sovereign Immunity, 1969 Proc. Am. Soc'y Int'l L. 187, 192 (rmmarks
of Monroe Leigh) [hereinafter cited as New Departures].
32. 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
33. Id. at 35. See also Victory Transp. Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y
Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 358 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965); Berizzi Bros.
Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
34. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor of the Department of State, to Philip B.
Perlman, Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 Dep't State Bull. 984 (192).
See also Bishop, New United States Policy Limiting Sovereign Immunity, 47 Am. J. Int'l L. 93
(1953).
35. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor of the Department of State, to Philip B.
Perlman, Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952), reprinted in, 26 Dep't State Bull. 984, 985
(1952).
36. See 1976 Hearings, supra note 3, at 34-35 (remarks of Monroe Leigh in response to a
question of Mr. Kindness).
37. 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961).
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that it had announced in the Tate letter, suggested that the suit be dismissed.
The court accepted the suggestion and dismissed the suit. However, underly-
ing the issuance of the suggestion, was the fact that the State Department had
just completed sensitive negotiations with Cuba regarding the return of a
United States airliner that had been hijacked and detained in Cuba."' Such a
bargain between the State Department and a foreign state involved in litiga-
tion often left the private litigant with no legal remedy.
In Chemical Natural Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Venezuela,39 a State
Department suggestion of immunity as to the commercial activity of a foreign
state was also accepted. The court concluded "that the State Department has
silently abandoned the 'revised and restricted policy' set forth in the Tate
letter and has substituted a case by case foreign Sovereign Immunity pol-
icy."'40 Indeed, the State Department, in a letter to the court, seemed to
countenance its own departure from the Tate letter by announcing that the
policies expressed therein were not unalterable.
4
'
It became apparent that the State Department was ill-equipped to make the
dispassionate legal decisions inherent in the application of the Tate letter.
4 2
Although the State Department did conduct informal hearings at which
parties to an action could present their views regarding the issue of sovereign
immunity, these hearings were hardly satisfactory to a private litigant seeking
full judicial review of his claim. Indeed, to the extent that the issue of
sovereign immunity presented a legal, rather than a political question, more
appropriately cognizable before the judiciary, the State Department in-
volvement ran afoul of fundamental notions of separation of powers and
judicial process. 43 Moreover, application of the Tate letter by the State
Department often posed a devil's choice:
If the Department [followed] the Tate letter in a given case, it [wasl in the incongruous
position of a political institution trying to apply a legal standard to litigation already
before the courts.
On the other hand, if forced to disregard the Tate letter in a given case, the
Department [was] in the self-defeating position of abandoning the very international
law principle it elsewhere [espoused]."
38. For a discussion of this case, see A. Chayes, T. Ehrlich & A. Lowenfeld, International
Legal Process 87-144 (1968). Rids has been characterized as "one of the international legal
monstrosities." New Departures, supra note 31, at 191 (remarks of Monroe Leigh quoting
Professor Lillich). One commentator has rejoined, "If cases such as Rich v. Naviera V'acuba are
to be characterized as 'legal monstrosities,' consider what a 'political monstrosity' the failure to
grant immunity could have occasioned in such a case." Id. at 194, (remarks of Michael H.
Cardozo). For a discussion of a case with similar political overtones, see Leigh, Sovereign
Immunity-The Case of the "Imias," 68 Am. J. Int'l L. 280 (1974).
39. 420 Pa. 134, 215 A.2d 864, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 822 (1966).
40. Id. at 159, 215 A.2d at 876.
41. Id. at 161, 215 A.2d at 876.
42. 1976 Hearings, supra note 3, at 58 (testimony of Peter D. Trooboff, Co-Chairman,
Comm. on Transnational Jud. Proc., A.B.A., Int'l Law Section).
43. Lowenfeld, Claims Against Foreign States-A Proposalfor Reform of United States Law,
44 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 901, 912-13 (1969).
44. 1976 Hearings, supra note 3, at 26 (testimony of Monroe Leigh).
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In order to "create some semblance of order out of chaos and unburden the
Department of State from the judicial function and political pressures,1 4
Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Basically, the Act
states a general premise of immunity4 6 and then creates exceptions to this
general principle. 47 A foreign state- will not be subject to suit under the Act
unless the activity of the foreign state, which is the subject of the suit, falls
within one of the specifically enumerated sections encompassing the excep-
tions to immunity. The general exceptions are waiver, 48 commercial activity
of the foreign state having a nexus with the United States, 49 expropriation
claims,5 0 litigation relating to rights in immovable, inherited and gift prop-
erty, 5 1 noncommercial torts, 52 and certain maritime liens. s3
III. EXCEPTIONS TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OF FOREIGN NATIONS
A. Codification of the Restrictive Theory of
Sovereign Immunity: Commercial Activity
The Act codifies the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity as expressed
in the Tate letter.5 4 The most important feature of the Act is that it removes
from the State Department decisions regarding sovereign immunity and dele-
gates the responsibility for these decisions to the judiciary.5 s The Act "builds
on a long-term principle of great importance, that the ability of American
courts to determine and apply international law through the domestic judicial
system should be strengthened. '5 6
The determination as to whether a particular act in question is commercial,
45. Sklaver, Sovereign Immunity in the United States: An Analysis of S. 566, 8 Int'l Law, 408
(1974).
46. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1604 (West Supp. 1977).
47. Id. §§ 1605-1607.
48. Id. § 1605(a)(1).
49. Id. § 1605(a)(2).
50. Id. § 1605(a)(3). This section will not be treated in the text. It should be noted, however,
that the Act does not affect existing law regarding the "act of state doctrine." 22 U.S.C. 2370(e)(2)
(1970). It should also be noted that the principle of sovereign immunity differs from the act of
state doctrine. The act of state doctrine recognized that "courts of one country will not sit in
judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory." Underhill v.
Hernandez 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). Traditionally, the act of state doctrine has been invoked
when American citizens seek review in a federal court of the actions of a foreign state that has
confiscated their property within its own territory, without rendering just compensation. SeeI generally, Comment, Rationalizing the Federal Act of State Doctrine and Evolving Judicial
Exceptions 46 Fordham L. Rev. 295 (1977).
51. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(4) (West Supp. 1977). This .ection will not be treated in the text. It
is a noncontroversial area and the legislation is consistent with prior case law. See note 13 supra.
52. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(5) (West Supp. 1977).
53. Id. at § 1605(b).
54. House Report, supra note 4, at 6605.
55. Id. at 6605-06.
56. Atkeson, Perkins & Wyatt, H.R. 11315-The Revised State-Justice Bill on Foreign
Sovereign Immunity: Time for Action, 70 Am. J. Int'l L. 298, 312 (1976) (footnote omitted).
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to which the Act denies immunity, or governmental, to which the Act affords
immunity, is to be made by reference to the nature of the act and not to its
purpose.5 7 While the Act does not provide a precise definition of commercial
activity, 58 certain activities of a foreign state such as the sale or service of a
product, leasing of property, borrowing of money, engagement of employees
or investment in American corporations would clearly constitute commercial
activity under the Act. 59 Essentially, a court "would inquire whether the
activity in question is one which private parties ordinarily perform or whether
it is peculiarly within the realm of governments. '60 Under this analysis, the
fact that goods or services which are the subject of the contract are eventually
to be used for a public purpose by a foreign state is irrelevant.
6
'
The Act provides three situations in which a foreign state engaging in a
commercial activity which establishes a jurisdictional nexus in the United
States would not be entitled to immunity.62 The first instance concerns
commercial activities which are carried on in the United States by the foreign
state. 63 Such activities might include entering into a contract here, or estab-
lishing a business office here in connection with the operation of a wholly
owned corporation. In this regard, the courts will have to conduct a factual
analysis on a case-by-case basis to determine whether a particular activity has
been performed in the United States. Secondly, there is no immunity where a
foreign state performs an act in the United States "in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere. ' 64 Thus, to the extent that
a foreign state engages in commercial activity here, even if in connection with
commercial activity to be performed elsewhere, it is subject to suit under the
Act. For example, as in Petrol Shipping,65 the act of entering into a contract
here, for the shipment of grain abroad, would constitute a sufficient nexus as
contemplated by the Act. The third situation arises where a foreign state
performs an "act outside the territory of the United States in connection with
57. House Report, supra note 4, at 6615.
58. Commercial activity is broadly defined as "either a regular course of commercial conduct
or a particular commercial transaction or act." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1603(d) (West Supp. 1977). "The
courts [will] have a great deal of latitude in determining what is a 'commercial activity' for
purposes of [the] bill." House Report, supra note 4, at 6615.
59. House Report, supra note 4, at 6615.
60. 1976 Hearings, supra note 3, at 53 (testimony of Monroe Leigh).
61. "This would mean, for example, that a foreign state's purchase of grain from a private
dealer would always be regarded as commercial, even if the grain were to serve some important
government purpose, such as replenishing government stores or feeding an army." 1976 Hearings,
supra note 3, at 27 (testimony of Monroe Leigh). Thus, under the Act, cases such as Isbrandtsen
Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971).
and Kingdom of Roumania v. Guaranty Trust Co. 250 F. 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 246 U S.
663 (1918), discussed at notes 21-23 supra and accompanying text, would have been decided
differently.
62. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(2) (West Supp. 1977).
63. Id.
64. Id.




a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a
direct effect in the United States. '66 Thus, when a foreign state engages in
commercial activity anywhere, and that activity has a "direct effect" in this
country, the foreign state will be amenable to suit under the Act. For exam-
ple, commercial activity by a foreign state abroad, such as price fixing, which
has the result of affecting prices here, would subject the foreign state to suit
here under the Act. It is suggested that "direct effect" be given a broad
construction, in recognition of the fact that would-be litigants harmed by such
activity, as a practical matter, have no other forum available in which to seek
judicial review of their claims.
Application of the rule stated in the third situation is perhaps the most
controversial aspect of the Act. However, the rule is in accord with interna-
tional practice.
[I]t is certain that the courts of many countries, . ..which have given their . ..
legislation a strictly territorial character, interpret [their] law in the sense that offenses,
the authors of which at the moment of commission are in the territory of another State,
are nevertheless to be regarded as having been committed in the national territory, if
one of the constituent elements of the offense, and more especially its effects, have
taken place there.
67
The extraterritorial application of United States laws has most often oc-
curred in the antitrust area. In United States v. Aluminum Corp. of Amer-
ica,68 one of the issues before the court was whether Aluminum, Ltd., a
Canadian corporation, had violated the United States antitrust laws. Answer-
ing in the affirmative the court stated: "[I]t is settled law ...that any state
may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for con-
duct outside its borders .. . which the state reprehends ... 69
Therefore, a foreign state which engages in commercial activity anywhere,
in contravention of any United States law, subjects itself to suit in the same
manner as a private individual if that activity has a "direct affect" within the
United States. In this regard, it is interesting to speculate how United States
courts might handle a suit brought against a country which has engaged in
economic sanctions against the United States having a direct effect here, as,
for example, the case of the Arab oil boycott. To the extent that the activity is
construed as commercial, and not political, 70 such a suit would be cognizable
under the Act.
B. Waiver of Sovereign rmmunity
The Act denies immunity where the foreign state has explicitly or implicitly
waived the defense of sovereign immunity. Under the Act, a foreign state may
66. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(2) (West Supp. 1977).
67. The S.S. Lotus, [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A., No. 10, at 23, quoted in Restatement (Second) of
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 18, at 52-53 (1965); see Hudson, The Sixth
Year of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 22 Am. J. Int'l L. 1, 8-14 (1928).
68. 148 F.2d 416 (2d. Cir. 1945).
69. Id. at 443.
70. See Timberg, Sovereign Immunity and Act of State Defenses: Transnational Boycotts and
Economic Coercion, 55 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 37 (1976).
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explicitly waive its immunity by treaty. 71 In this regard, the United States has
entered into many treaties with foreign states containing express waivers of
sovereign immunity for the purpose of facilitating trade and commerce be-
tween the countries.7 2 Where such a treaty exists, it will constitute an explicit
waiver of sovereign immunity.
A foreign state may also explicitly waive immunity by contract. 7 3 Prior to
the passage of the Act, a private litigant who had secured such a waiver
would nonetheless often be left remediless against the foreign state because of
the unwillingness of the courts to ignore State Department suggestions. For
example, in Isbrandtsen Tankers v. President of India,74 the plaintiff had
entered into a contract with the defendant in which the defendant had given
an express waiver of sovereign immunity and consented to be sued in the
Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York. When a dispute
arose, and the plaintiff sued, the court deferred to a State Department
suggestion and dismissed the suit notwithstanding evidence of the waiver.
Under the Act, such explicit waivers will be given effect.
Examples of implied waiver under the Act, consistent with prior case law,
would be an agreement to arbitrate or the filing of a responsive pleading
without raising the defense of sovereign immunity.75 For instance, in Victory
Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes ,76
where the Spanish General Consul had entered into an agreement containing
an arbitration clause, the court rejected the defense of sovereign immunity
stating: "Implicit in the agreement to arbitrate is consent to enforcement of
that agreement. '77 Similarly, in another case, 78 the Republic of Cuba sought
to enter a defense of sovereign immunity, three years after entering a general
appearance in the action. The court rejected the attempt stating that "[c]on-
71. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(1) (West Supp. 1977).
72. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Denmark, Oct. 1, 1951.
12 U.S.T. 908, T.I.A.S. No. 4947 (effective July 30, 1961); Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation with the Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 29, 1954, 7 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No.
3593 (effective July 14, 1956); Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Italy, Feb.
2, 1948, 63 Stat 2255 (1949), T.I.A.S. No. 1965 (effective July 26, 1949).
73. House Report, supra note 4, at 6617. Attorneys drafting express waivers of sovereign
immunity should be certain that the language contained therein is clear and unequivocal. An
example of a well-drafted waiver might be: "The undersigned [foreign state] hereby waives all
defenses, offsets, counterclaims at law, equity or admiralty to payment based on any . . .
governmental ownership or relationship and confirms that the obligation hereunder is wholly
commercial in nature and that any defense in relation thereto by reason of sovereignty is
inapplicable and expressly waived." Waiver adopted from Martropico Compania Naviera S.A. v.
Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 177 N.Y.L.J., June 28, 1977, at 11,
col. 4.
74. 446 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971).
75. See House Report, supra note 4, at 6617.
76. 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965). See also Petrol Shipping
Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece, 360 F.2d 103 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 931 (1966).
77. 336 F.2d at 364.




sent to suit [was] manifested and [a] waiver of sovereign immunity accom-
plished when the sovereign enter[ed] a general appearance . . . unaccom-
panied by a claim of immunity. '79 It has been suggested that the law of
implicit waiver is beyond the scope of resolution by legislation."0 However,
the general tenor of the Act is cast in favor of restricting sovereign immunity.
It is suggested, therefore, that the scope of implied waiver should be given
wide breadth to allow litigants their day in court and to allow the courts to
develop precedent on a case-by-case basis.
It should be noted that the Act precludes a foreign state from unilaterally
withdrawing its waiver when a dispute arises. 8 ' However, the Act does not
proscribe the withdrawal of a waiver before the cause of action accrues. For
example, assume that a private citizen and a foreign state enter into a
long-term contract, and that the foreign state provides an express waiver of
immunity. During the term of the contract, but before any breach, the foreign
state withdraws its waiver. 82 The foreign state thereafter breaches the con-
tract. Since the Act deals only with withdrawal of a waiver after a dispute
arises, the citizen has no remedy under section 1605(a)(1). Notwithstanding
such a withdrawal, however, to the extent that the activities of the foreign
state are commercial, a cause of action may exist under section 1605(a)(2). 83
C. Noncommercial Torts
Section 1605(a)(5) is similar in effect, and in operation, to the Federal Tort
Claims Act. 84 The purpose of the section is to permit the victim of a tortious
act or omission committed within the United States by an employee of a
foreign state acting within the scope of his employment to maintain an action
against the foreign state.8 5 This section gives United States citizens similar
rights vis-a-vis foreign states for damages resulting from torts, as have been
awarded to private individuals in actions against the United States abroad.
For example, in Holoubek v. United States,8 6 a car owned by the United
States and driven by a United States embassy agent struck an Austrian
citizen. The citizen sued the United States in an Austrian court which, in a
79. Id. at 625.
80. See Atkeson, Perkins & Wyatt, H.R. 11315-The Revised State-Justice Bill on Foreign
Sovereign Immunity: Time for Action, 70 Am. J. Int'l L. 298, 304 (1976).
81. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(1) (West Supp. 1977); House Report, supra note 4, at 6617.
82. Hypothetical adopted from Sklaver, Sovereign Immunity in the United States: An
Analysis of S. 566, 8 Int'l Law. 408, 414 (1974).
83. See notes 58-61 supra and accompanying text.
84. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1970). Compare, e.g., id. § 2680(a)(b) with 28 U.S.C.A. §
1605(a)(5) (West Supp. 1977).
85. House Report, supra note 4, at 6619-20. Note that § 1605(a)(5) does not apply to
diplomats and consuls. With regard to consuls, see the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
and Optional Protocol Disputes, effective with respect to the United States Dec. 24, 1963, art. 43,
21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. 6820.
86. Holoubek v. United States, 2 Ob. 243.60, 84 Juristische Bliitter 43 (Sup. Ct. of Austria
1961), cited in Reeves, The Foreign Sovereign Before United States Courts, 38 Fordham L. Rev.
455, 457 n.9 (1970).
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well-reasoned opinion, declined to grant immunity to the United States. The
court alluded to the fact that in a converse situation, a foreign state, such as
the United States, could undoubtedly sue a citizen in a local court for
damages. Therefore, it concluded that it would be inequitable to leave the
citizen "remediless vis-a-vis the foreign state. 817 It should be noted that while
this section is specifically designed to deal with the problem of motor vehicle
accidents, it is clear that it will be broadly construed to permit judicial review
of all manner of tortious claims against foreign states.8 8 This construction is in
keeping with the general tenor of the Act.
D. Maritime Liens
Under traditional admiralty practice, a claimant could commence an action
by seizure of a vessel under process based on a libel in rem, which vested the
claimant with an in rem claim. 89 However, with respect to litigation involv-
ing vessels of foreign states this method was not available. 90 In Berizzi
Brothers Co. v. S.S. Pesaro," plaintiff brought an action for damages arising
out of the failure of defendant to deliver goods which had been the subject of
a contract between them. The action was commenced, by attaching the
steamship "Pesaro" which had received the goods at her port in Italy. How-
ever, because the steamship was owned and possessed by the Government of
Italy, the court held that the vessel, even if engaged in commercial activities,
was immune from arrest under process based on a libel in rem. The rule
enunciated in Berizzi Brothers operated to preclude private litigants from
commencing suits in admiralty against foreign states by an in rem seizure,
although this was often the only available method open to them. 92 An excep-
tion to the rule was developed by the Supreme Court in Republic of Mexico v.
Hoffman. 93 In Hoffman, a citizen of the United States had commenced an
action by libel in rem of a vessel owned by the Republic of Mexico. The Court
87. Id.
88. House Report, supra note 4, at 6619-20.
89. This procedure is based upon the doctrine of personification. Personification is a legal
fiction that the claimant is actually proceeding against the vessel itself as the offending thing
rather than against its owner. As Mr. Justice Holmes had stated: "A ship is the most living of
inanimate things." 0. Holmes, The Common Law 26 (1881). Under this procedure, claimant's
recovery was limited to the value of the vessel. This did not, however, preclude a subsequent in
personam action against the owner of the vessel to recover any deficiency in the claim not
recovered in the first action. G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty § 9-90, at 801-02 (2d
ed. 1975).
90. See Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812), discussed at note
11 supra and accompanying texL
91. 271 U.S. 562 (1926), discussed at note 11 supra.
92. In many cases the foreign state defendant was "present" here only through its property,
specifically, in admiralty matters, its vessels. Unavailability of an in rem seizure was thus often
fatal to plaintiff's claim as "[i]n many cases, jurisdiction could probably not be obtained
otherwise." Ocean Transp. Co. v. Government of Republic of Ivory Coast, 269 F. Supp. 703, 705
n.8 (E.D. La. 1967).
93. 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
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declined to grant immunity to the vessel, holding that a commercial vessel
which was owned, but not possessed, by a foreign government 94 at the time
the action was commenced was not immune from seizure. 95
The Act codifies the rule of Berizzi Brothers, by obviating admiralty quasi
in rem jurisdiction. 96 To this end, it contains a drastic penalty for attachment
of a vessel or cargo of a foreign state. For unless the plaintiff was unaware
that the vessel was owned by a foreign state,9 7 arrest or attachment thereof
will entitle the foreign state to immunity. 98 The Act permits the plaintiff to
bring suit by instituting an in personam action against the foreign state. 99 The
action is commenced by delivery of a summons and complaint to the master
or other person having possession of the vessel or cargo such as the second in
command.' 00 Furthermore, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he has taken
steps to assure that the foreign state itself receives copies of the summons and
complaint. 0 1 The purpose of this requirement is to make certain that the
foreign state receives notice of the proceeding even if the copies delivered to
the master fail to reach the foreign state. 0 2
The plaintiff may then recover on an in personam claim against the foreign
state for an amount not greater than the value of the vessel or cargo.10 3
94. The Court noted that the vessel in question had been leased to a private Mexican
corporation under a contract with the Mexican Government, and that the vessel was operating In
a private freighting venture when it was seized. Id. at .33.
95. Hoffman was followed in S.T. Tringali Co. v. Tug Pemex XV, 274 F. Supp. 227, 230
(S.D. Tex. 1967), where the court permitted an in rem seizure of the vessels in question after it
had ascertained that the vessels, ostensibly the property of a foreign sovereign, were; in fact,
owned and operated by an independent foreign corporation.
96. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(b) (West Supp. 1977); see House Report, supra note 4, at 6620.
Section 1605(b) parallels the provisions in Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-752 (1970),
relating to the exercise of in rem jurisdiction over vessels owned by the United States. It is
anticipated that the loss of quasi in rem jurisdiction will be compensated by the additional in
personam remedies available against foreign states. See 1976 Hearings, supra note 3, at 97-98
(testimony of Michael M. Cohen, Chairman of the Committee on Maritime Legislation of the
Maritime Law Association of the United States). In addition, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1610, discussed at
notes 186-207 infra and accompanying text, which provides for postjudgment execution in certain
circumstances, will compensate for the loss of prejudgment attachment and arrest. 1976 Hear-
ings, supra note 3, at 98 (testimony of Michael Cohen).
97. This would be a rare case. The flag of the vessel, the circumstances giving rise to the
maritime lien, or the information contained in ship registers should alert the plaintiff as to the
ownership of the vessel or cargo. House Report, supra note 4, at 6620.
98. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(b)(1) (West Supp. 1977). The penalty invoked by attachment of a
vessel or cargo (loss of in personam jurisdiction) has been criticized as bearing no relationship to
the offense. See Report by the Comm. on Int'l Law of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New
York, The Sovereign Immunity Act of 1975, reprinted in 1976 Hearings, supra note 3, at 75.
99. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(b) (West Supp. 1977); House Report, supra note 4, at 6620.
100. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(b)(1) (West Supp. 1977.).
101. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(b)(2) (West Supp. 1977). Thus the plaintiff must, in effect, serve the
foreign state as well. Service under the Act is discussed at notes 156-68 infra and accompanying
text.
102. House Report, supra note 4, at 6621.
103. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(b) (West Supp. 1977). This is in accord with practice under the
common law. See note 89 supra.
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However, the plaintiff may still commence a second action in accordance with
the procedures discussed above, to recover the amount by which the value of
the maritime lien exceeds the recovery in the first action.' 0 4
IV. COUNTERCLAIMS AGAINST FOREIGN STATES
The position of a defendant seeking to recover on a counterclaim against a
foreign state was originally an unenviable one. "[T]he defendant when sued
by a foreign sovereign [could not] avail himself of any counterclaim or set-off
except perhaps [as] a set-off arising out of the same transaction. Under no
circumstances [could] he obtain an affirmative judgment."'10 - However, the
courts soon began to realize the inequity of permitting a foreign government
to invoke the aid of judicial process in seeking to enforce its claims, and yet
evade such process with respect to claims asserted against it.1
0 6
In National City Bank of New York v. Republic of China, 07 the Republic
of China sued to recover a $200,000 deposit. The Bank interposed an unre-
lated counterclaim seeking an affirmative judgment of $1,634,432 on de-
faulted Treasury notes issued by the Republic of China and owned by the
Bank. After the district court dismissed the counterclaims on the grounds of
sovereign immunity,108 the bank appealed. While the appeal was pending the
bank sought leave from the district court to amend the counterclaims by
dropping the claim for affirmative relief and by asserting them as defensive
setoffs instead. The district court denied leave.' 0 9 The Second Circuit
affirmed the denial on the ground that the counterclaims were not based on
the subject matter of the suit. °10 The Supreme Court reversed and remanded
the case with directions to reinstate the counterclaims as amended."' While
the Court admitted that the counterclaims in question could not be regarded
as related to the subject matter of the suit," ' 2 considerations of "fair dealing"
mandated that the counterclaims denominated as setoffs be permitted." 3 The
Court noted that "[the Republic of China] wants our law .... but it wants our
law free from the claims of justice."' 14 It became well settled that a foreign
104. Commentators on § 1605(b) had noted that the section, as drafted, did not expressly
provide for such a second in personamn action for the balance of the claim. See Statement by the
Int'l Law and Transactions Div. of the D.C. Bar, reprinted in 1976 Hearings, supra note 3, at 69.
The legislative record, however, makes clear that such a second action is permissible. House
Report, supra note 4, at 6621.
105. Kingdom of Roumania v. Guaranty Trust Co., 250 F. 341, 34344 (2d Cir.), crt.
denied, 246 U.S. 663 (1918). See also The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152 (1868); French Republic v.
Inland Nay. Co., 263 F. 410 (E.D. Mo. 1920).
106. National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 361 (1955).
107. Id.
108. Republic of China v. National City Bank, 108 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), affld, 203
F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1953), rev'd, 348 U.S. 356 (1954). See also notes 111-14 infra and accompanying
text (discussing the ultimate reversal of the district court's findings).
109. Republic of China v. National City Bank, 14 F.R.D. 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
110. Republic of China v. National City Bank, 208 F.2d 627, 629 (2d Cir. 1953).
111. 348 U.S. 356, 366 (1955).
112. Id. at 364-65.
113. Id. at 365.
114. Id. at 361-62.
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state which commenced an action waived immunity from a counterclaim to
the extent that the counterclaim did not exceed the foreign state's claim and
did not seek an affirmative judgment."15
Under the Act, a foreign state which initiates or intervenes in a proceeding
automatically waives immunity from a counterclaim in three situations.'"
6
First, the foreign state will not be immune from a counterclaim if the coun-
terclaim could have been brought as a direct claim in a separate action under
the Act. 1 17 In this situation, the defendant seeking to interpose a counterclaim
would have to prove that the counterclaim falls within one of the exceptions
to the general rule of sovereign immunity discussed earlier.'' 8 Second, even if
the foreign state is otherwise entitled to immunity, it would not be immune
from a counterclaim arising out of the same transaction or occurrence which
forms the subject matter of the claim of the foreign state.' 19 This is consistent
with the notions of equity recognized at common law: namely, that a foreign
state seeking justice in United States courts should not be immune from
related claims which would reduce or exceed its recovery.'
2 0
Finally, where a foreign state retains immunity under the previous two
situations, it would not be protected from a setoff.' 2 1 This codifies the rule set
forth in National City Bank of New York v. Republic of China.'22 Thus,
under the Act, a defendant is permitted to interpose a defensive setoff, even if
the setoff arises out of an unrelated transaction or occurrence not indepen-
dently cognizable under the Act.
These provisions represent a significant improvement in the status of coun-
terclaims against foreign states. No longer may a foreign state don the cloak
of sovereignty to escape legitimate claims which exceed or reduce its recovery.
115. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First Nat'l Bank, 270 F. Supp. 1004, 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1967),
rev'd, 431 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1970), vacated and remanded, 400 U.S. 1019, rev'd, 442 F.2d 530 (2d
Cir. 1971), rev'd and remanded, 406 U.S. 759 (1972), affid, 478 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1973);
Hungarian People's Republic v. Cecil Ass'n, Inc., 118 F. Supp. 954, 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Russia
v. Bankers' Trust Co., 4 F. Supp. 417, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), affld sub nom. United States v.
National City Bank, 83 F.2d 236, 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 563 (1936). But see Et Ve
Balik Kurumu v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 25 Misc. 2d 299, 309, 204 N.Y.S.2d 971, 982 (Sup.
Ct. 1960), affd mem., 17 App. Div. 2d 927, 233 N.Y.S.2d 1013 (1962) (court took the view that
an affirmative judgment could be rendered on a counterclaim against a foreign state where the
counterclaim arose out of the same transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the
foreign state's claim).
116. House Report, supra note 4, at 6605-06.
117. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1607(a) (West Supp. 1977).
118. See notes 48-53 supra and accompanying text.
119. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1607(b) (West Supp. 1977). This is based on rule 13(a) of the Fed. R. Civ.
P. See also Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 70(2) (1965).
120. Et Ve Balik Kurumu v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 25 Misc. 2d 299, 309, 204 NY.S.2d
971, 982 (Sup. Ct. 1960), affid mem., 17 App. Div. 2d 927, 233 N.Y.S.2d 1013 (1962), discussed
at note 115 supra. Letter from Monroe Leigh, Legal Advisor, Dep't of State, to the Solicitor
General (Nov. 26, 1975), reprinted in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425
U.S. 682, 706, 708 (1976).
121. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1607(c) (West Supp. 1977).
122. 348 U.S. 356 (1955).
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V. COMMENCEMENT OF AN ACTION AGAINST
A FOREIGN STATE
The commencement of an action by service of process upon a foreign
sovereign has been described as a" 'catch as catch can' proposition."'12 3 This
area has been a source of considerable trouble to litigators seeking to obtain
jurisdiction over the foreign state by service of process.t 24 Problems arise
because Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not provide for
service upon a foreign state. 12 5 Furthermore, personal service upon a consular
representative 126 or an ambassador'"7 has been unequivocally rejected: "The
person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not be liable to any
form of arrest or detention."' 28 Indeed, service upon the person of an
ambassador may be a felony. 129
The rationale underlying this prohibition was explained in Hellenic Lines,
Ltd. v. Moore, 130 where a shipping company brought a mandamus action to
compel a United States Marshall to serve process on the Tunisian ambas-
sador. The State Department sent a letter to the court which stated:
The maintenance of friendly foreign relations between the United States and the
[foreign] state concerned would certainly be prejudiced by service of process on an
ambassador against his will. The ... state might well protest to the Department that
123. Lowenfeld, Claims Against Foreign States-A Proposal for Reform of United States
Law, 44 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 901, 921 (1969).
124. Miller, Service of Process on State, Local, and Foreign Governments Under Rule 4,
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-Some Unfinished Business for the Rulemakers, 46 F. RD. 101,
121-22 (1969). It should be noted that the issue of sovereign immunity arises only after
jurisdiction has been obtained. Indeed, as stated by the Supreme Court, sovereign immunity
"presents no question of the jurisdiction of the district court over the person of a (foreign state]
defendant. Such jurisdiction must be acquired either by the service of process or by the
defendant's appearance or participation in the litigation." Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S.
578, 587 (1943).
125. See Miller, Service of Process on State, Local, and Foreign Governments Under Rule 4,
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-Some Unfinished Business for the Rulemakers, 46 F.R.D 101,
121-22 (1969). Rule 4(i) provides for service in foreign countries but does not deal with service
upon a foreign state. For further discussion, see 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure, Civil §§ 1133-36 (1967).
126. Purdy Co. '. Argentina, 333 F.2d 95, 97 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S, 962
(1965) ("a foreign consul is not... an agent of the government he represents.., for purposes of
the service of process."); Oster v. Dominion of Canada, 144 F. Supp. 746, 748-49 (N.D.N.Y.),
affd per curiam sub nom. Clay v. Dominion of Canada, 238 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
353 U.S. 936 (1957).
127. Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Moore, 345 F.2d 978, 980-81 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
128. Id. at 980 n.4. See also Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States §§ 73-93 (1965).
129.' See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 253 (1970) (Any person involved in issuing process against an
ambassador or public minister of a foreign state "shall be deemed a violator of the laws of nations
and a disturber of the public repose, and shall be imprisoned for not more than three years
130. 345 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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the United States had failed to protect the person and dignity of its official representa-
tive. . . . Other governments might interpret the incident as meaning that the
Government of the United States had decided, as a matter of policy, to depart from
what they had considered a universally accepted rule of international law and prac-
tice.' 3'
Resourceful litigators who had commenced actions by direct mailing of
process to a diplomatic mission of a foreign state engendered considerable
controversy within the State Department. In 1973, the Department stated that
"[w]hile both international law and United States law prohibit service of
process by a Marshall on [the person of] a foreign ambassador without his
consent, it was generally accepted during the drafting of the Vienna Conven-
tion on Diplomatic Relations that this prohibition does not apply to service
effected by mail."' 32 However, in 1974, the Department reversed its position
and concluded that the Vienna Convention provided "a basis for objection to
the propriety of process served [by mail].' 33
Litigators seeking to commence an action by attaching the assets of a
foreign state faced equal uncertainty. In New York and Cuba Mail Steamship
Co. v. Republic of Korea,134 plaintiffs vessel sustained damage at defendant's
port. When plaintiff commenced a suit in admiralty by attachment of the
defendant's bank accounts in the United States, the State Department filed a
suggestion that the property of the defendant was immune from attachment
under international law. The court vacated the attachment and consequently
dismissed the suit.135 This principle was modified in Weilamann v. Chase
Manhattan Bank. 136 There, plaintiff brought an action (pursuant to a default
judgment) seeking attachment of certain funds of the Soviet Union held by the
defendant bank. Upon request of the Soviet Union, the State Department
issued a letter to the court which stated: "The Department is of the ... view
that even when the attachment of the property of a foreign sovereign is not
prohibited for the purpose of jurisdiction, nevertheless the property so at-
tached and levied upon cannot be retained tosatisfy a judgment."'' 37 The rule
now appeared to be that the attachment of a foreign state's assets for purposes
of obtaining jurisdiction was permitted while attachment for purposes of
execution was prohibited. 13 Consequently, the operation of the rule placed
the private litigant in the anomalous position of having to release the attached
res when he received a decision in his favor. Indeed, this contradicted the
131. Id. at 980 n.5.
132. Litigating, supra note 8, at 44 (remarks of J. Roderick Heller III).
133. Id. (footnote omitted).
134. 132 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
135. Id. at 687.
136. 21 Misc. 2d 1086, 192 N.Y.S.2d 469 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
137. Text of letter reprinted in 6 M. Whiteman, Digest of Int'l Law 709, 711 (1.968).
138. See, e.g., Ocean Transp. Co. v. Government of Ivory Coast, 269 F. Supp. 703, 705 n.8
(E.D. La. 1967) (The court stated that "where under International Law a foreign government Is




very purpose of quasi in rem jurisdiction which is to allow the prevailing
litigant to apply the attached res to satisfy his claim. 139
A new method of commencing suit against foreign states soon developed
whereby the actual service of process was relegated to a notice function
similiar to that of state long-arm statutes. 140 Under such statutes, jurisdiction
is conferred when the defendant has committed some act within the territorial
entity. 14 1 Thus, in Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abas-
tecimientos y Transportes,'42 the Second Circuit found that a contractual
agreement to arbitrate in New York by the Spanish Ministry of Commerce
constituted consent to in personam jurisdiction in New York. 14 3 Service of
process by registered mail to defendant's office in Madrid was therefore
upheld, since the court concluded that the only function of the process was to
give the defendant notice of the action. 44 Similarly, in another case,' 4 5 the
plaintiff had entered into a contract with Uruguay's Ministry of Public Works
to widen and improve two highways in Uruguay. A dispute arose and the
court held that the presence of Ministry engineers in Los Angeles, where the
contract had been finalized, was sufficient contact with the forum to subject
Uruguay to personal jurisdiction under California's long-arm statute.' 46
The Second Circuit also developed an alternative theory to uphold such
methods of service. Illustrative of this is Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of
Greece Ministry of Commerce,' 47 where the parties had entered into an
agreement which contained an arbitration clause similar to the one in Victory
Transport. Service by registered mail to the sovereign's New York Ministry of
Commerce, where the contract had been negotiated, was upheld, as the
service was reasonably calculated to give notice. 14 8 The court based its
holding on the power of the district courts to fashion rules of service in
accordance with their general rulemaking authority as promulgated by Rule
83 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
149
139. Lowenfeld, Claims Against Foreign States-A Proposal for Reform of United States
Law, 44 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 901, 908 (1969).
140. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 302 (McKinney 1972).
141. See Reese & Galston, Doing an Act or Causing Consequenees as Bases of Judicial
Jurisdiction, 44 Iowa L. Rev. 249 (1959).
142. 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
143. Id. at 363.
144. Id. at 364.
145. Republic Int'l Corp. v. Amco Engineers, Inc., 516 F.2d 161 (9th Cir. 1975).
146. Id. at 168.
147. 360 F.2d 103 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 931 (1960).
148. Id. at 110.
149. Id. at 108. Petrol was followed in Renchard v. Humphreys & Harding, Inc., 59 F.R.D.
530 (D.D.C. 1973), where a District of Columbia resident brought an action against the
Government of Brazil alleging that his home had been damaged during construction of the
Brazilian embassy. He attempted service by sending copies of the summons and complaint, by
registered mail, to both the Brazilian embassy in Washington, D.C., and the Ministry of External
Relations for the Government of Brazil in Brazilia. The court upheld both methods of service
stating that they were "reasonably calculated to provide adequate notice." Id. at 531.
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Victory Transport is a landmark case, important for its recognition that
service of process on a foreign state should essentially serve a notice function.
Together with the subsequent judicial refinements discussed above, it
foreshadowed the development of the long-arm section of the Act'50 which is
designed to relegate service of process to a notice function only.1'5
While the Act creates federal long-arm jurisdiction over foreign states, 112 a
foreign state will not be amenable to suit under the Act unless it has engaged
in one of the enumerated activities constituting an exception of the general
immunity of foreign states. 153 Engaging in such activity will establish the
necessary contacts that must exist between the foreign state and the appropri-
ate forum before jurisdiction can be exercised. 154 It is clear that the Act
contemplates a case-by-case analysis of the activity of the foreign state to
determine if it has in fact established the necessary contacts. In this regard,
the Act should be liberally construed in order to accommodate judicial consid-
eration of meritorious claims.
Where a foreign state does in fact engage in one of the enumerated ac-
tivities, it will be amenable to suit if it has received adequate notice of the
150. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1330(b) (West Supp. 1977).
151. See New Departures, supra note 31, at 186 (remarks of M. Belman).
152. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1330(b) (West Supp. 1977). See also 1976 Hearings, supra note 3, at 97
(testimony of Michael A. Cohen). But note that at least one commentator has stated that the Act
does not create a true long-arm provision. "[T]he bill is not a 'long-arm statute,' which is only
necessary when the defendant is not 'present.' Foreign countries are 'present' here by virtue of
their embassies and activities, and the bill is merely a rdeans of getting personal jurisdiction."
Litigating, supra note 8, at 57 (remarks of Michael H. Cardozo).
153. See notes 48-53 supra and accompanying text. It should be noted that the Act contains
four express provisions regarding venue in actions against foreign states. First, an action may be
brought "in any judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise
to the claim occurred." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391(f)(1) (West Supp. 1977). Thus in those cases involving
a direct effect in the United States as a consequence of commercial activity abroad, see notes
66-70 supra and accompanying text, venue would lie wherever the direct effect was manifested,
see House Report, supra note 4, at 6631.
Second, where property is involved, venue would lie in the judicial district where the property
that is the subject of the action is located. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391(f)(1) (West Supp. 1977). For
instance, if a plaintiff sued a foreign state defendant in ejectment over the right to occupy a
certain building, venue would lie in that district where the building was located. See House
Report, supra note 4, at 6631. Third, admiralty actions commenced pursuant to § 1605(b) may be
brought in the district where the vessel or cargo is situated at the time of the commencement of
the suit. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391(f)(2) (West Supp. 1977). Fourth, actions against agencies or
instrumentalities of foreign states may be brought wherever they are licensed to do business, or
are doing business. Id. at § 1391(f)(3) (West Supp. 1977).
Actions against the foreign state or its political subdivisions may also be brought in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia. Id. at § 1391(f)(4) (West Supp. 1977). This Is
based upon the fact that most foreign states have diplomatic representatives in Washington,
D.C., and therefore may find it easier to defend a suit there. See House Report, supra note 4, at
6631.
154. House Report, supra note 4, at 6612. See also McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355
U.S. 220 (1957); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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action as required under the Act.'5s Proper notice includes any method of
service that may have been agreed to by the parties."5 6 This is, indeed, the
preferred method, as the Act seeks to encourage such arrangements.' 7 The
latitude granted to the parties by this provision is of immense value to private
citizens who engage in large numbers of transactions with foreign states.
Contracts between private citizens and foreign states should include provi-
sions regarding service which will facilitate convenient and efficient service
should a dispute arise. Such a provision might include language to the effect
that service at the place where the contract was entered into, or at the office
of the foreign state's nearest business representative, will constitute valid
service for purposes of claims arising under the contract.' sg
Service upon a foreign state or its political subdivisions may also be effected
by registered mail. I 9 Under this option, the foreign state would receive notice
of the action by a "notice of suit" sent to the head of the ministry of foreign
affairs for the foreign state concerned. A "notice of suit" would advise the
foreign state of the legal proceeding and would also contain a short explana-
tion regarding the significance of the summons and complaint, as well as the
steps required to defend the action. 60 This procedure has the benefit of
arming the litigant with the knowledge that such service cannot be adverted
by a supposedly unwary foreign state.
As a last resort, service may be effected through diplomatic channels.' 6'
This method is not preferred, however, as a foreign state could protest the use
of diplomatic channels to convey notice of a legal proceeding not of a strictly
diplomatic nature. Notwithstanding the possibility of such irritation, "[sler-
vice through diplomatic channels is widely used in international practice....
It is accepted and indeed preferred by the United States in suits brought
against the United States Government in foreign courts."' 62 Service by dip-
lomatic transmittal would be effected by the Secretary of State, Director of
Special Consular Services.' 63 It is suggested that plaintiffs avoid use of this
155. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1608 (West Supp. 1977). Note that under the Act, the distinctions
between in personam, in rem, and quasi in rem jurisdiction are eliminated. Service under § 1608
vests the plaintiff with an in personam claim.
156. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1608(a)(1), (b)(1) (West Supp. 1977).
157. House Report, supra note 4, at 6623.
158. See, e.g., Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece, 360 F.2d 103 (2d Cir). cet.
denied, 385 U.S. 931 (1966); note 20 supra and accompanying text.
159. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1608(a)(3) (West Supp. 1977).
160. House Report, supra note 4, at 6623.
161. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1608(a)(4) (West Supp. 1977).
162. House Report, supra note 4, at 6624. See also Litigating, supro note 8. at 45 n.5, for a
list of countries that serve the United States through diplomatic means.
163. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1608(a)(4) (West Supp. 1977). Transmittal via diplomatic channels could
entail two alternative procedures. First, the Office of Special Consular Services in the Depart-
ment of State could "pouch" a copy of the papers to the United States Embassy for the foreign
state in question. The Embassy would deliver a diplomatic note of transmittal along %ith the
other papers to an appropriate official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the foreign state.
Alternatively, the Department of State could transmit the papers to the foreign state's embassy in
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last option. The liberalized methods discussed above provide certainty and
efficiency without the possibility of diplomatic irritation or political inexpe-
diency. It is not difficult to imagine a situation where the State Department
would be less than enthusiastic about its role as a vehicle in the commence-
ment of a suit. For example, even without the possibility of the issuance of a
State Department suggestion, a situation such as that in Rich v. Naviera
Vacuba S.A.,164 might well discourage the Secretary of State from commenc-
ing diplomatic transmittal. Plaintiffs contemplating use of this method should
be aware of possible political or foreign relations repercussions which may
result in delay of transmittal.
In addition to the procedures mentioned above, the Act provides that
service may be made on an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state by
delivery of the summons and complaint to an officer, managing agent, or any
other general agent thereof, authorized to receive process within the United
States. 165 Here, "state laws which designate, or compel [agencies or in-
strumentalities of a foreign state] to appoint, agents for service of process will
. . . be of assistance to would-be litigants."'1 66 Such state laws have the
beneficial effect of making the agency or instrumentality immediately amena-
ble to suit without recourse to any of the methods previously mentioned.
Moreover, with respect to agencies and instrumentalities, the Act "au-
thoizes [sic] [the courts] to fashion a method of service . . . 'consistent with
the law of the place where service is to be made.' ,1"67 This is a catch-all
provision which will permit plaintiffs to serve process in the manner provided
for in the place where the defendant is found. Under this provision, a foreign
sovereign will not be heard to object to the propriety of service, since service
will have been effected in accordance with its own laws. Conversely, service
under this section will not be available when it is prohibited by the foreign
state where service is to be made. 1
68
As a result of the provisions discussed above, plaintiffs should have little
trouble commencing actions against foreign states. The Act obviates the
confusion and uncertainty experienced under the common law. By providing
both convenience and certainty, the service provisions serve as an integral
part in effectuating one of the purposes of the Act: to give the plaintiff his day
in court.
Washington, D.C. House Report, supra note 4, at 6623. Under either option, there is no
requirement that the foreign state actually accept the documents as long as they have been
transmitted in such a way that the foreign state has actual notice of the suit. Id.
164. 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961); see notes 37-38 supra and accompanying text.
165. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1608(b)(2) (West Supp. 1977). The Act also provides for service on
agencies or instrumentalities by letters rogatory or request or by registered mail. 28 U.S.C.A. §
1608(b)(3)(A) & (B) (West Supp. 1977). These procedures are fully explained in the legislative
history and will not be treated here. See House Report, supra note 4,at 6624.
166. Atkeson, Perkins, & Wyatt, H.R. 11315-The Revised State-Justice Bill on Foreign
Sovereign Immunity: Time for Action, 70 Am. J. Int'l L. 298, 303 (1976) (footnote omitted).
167. House Report, supra note 4, at 6624 (quoting 28 U.S.C.A. § 1608(b)(3)(C) (West Supp.
1977)). This approach parallels the methods employed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 83. See notes
147-49 supra and accompanying text.
168. House Report, supra note 4, at 6624.
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VI. EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS
Under the common law, a prevailing litigant seeking to enforce a judgment
against a foreign state was often without a remedy. This unfortunate situation
occurred because "property [of a foreign state could not] be retained to satisfy
a judgment ensuing from the suit .... ",169 Similarly, the defendant who had
prevailed on a counterclaim against a foreign sovereign was left with a
judgment of often "nugatory" value. ' 70 Although, as a practical matter, most
foreign governments honored judgments awarded against them in order to
avoid political repercussions which could result from the plaintiff's govern-
ment pursuing the claim,' 7 1 the possibility still existed that the foreign state
could choose to either default 72 or simply run away from the judgment.'73
In Dexter & Carpenter, Inc. v. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyretsen,'17 4 plaintiff, a
judgment creditor of defendant, an entity of the Government of Sweden, had
sought to execute on funds of the defendant deposited in a bank in New York
City.' 7 5 Sweden filed a claim of immunity from execution. The court, while
acknowledging that an " 'award of execution is... an essential part, of every
judgment passed by a court exercising judicial power,' "176 nevertheless up-
held Sweden's claim of immunity stating that "[t]he clear weight of authority
in this country, as well as that of England . . . is against all seizures, even
though a valid judgment has been entered."' 7 7
169. Letter from the State Department to the United States Attorney General (June 22, 959).
quoted in Stephen v. Zionosteska Banka Nat'l Corp., 15 App. Div. 2d 111. 116. 222 N Y.S.2d
128, 134 (1961), aff'd per curiam, 12 N.Y.2d 781, 186 N.E.2d 676, 235 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1962).
170. Dexter & Carpenter, Inc. v. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen, 43 F.2d 705 (2d Cir 1930). cert.
denied, 282 U.S. 896 (1931).
171. Note, The First Decade of the Tate Letter Policy, 60 Mich. L. Rev. 1142, 1151 (1962).
172. See Kane v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 267 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Pa. 1967). affld
per curiam, 394 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1968).
173. See Rich v. Naviera Vacuba S.A., 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961); notes 37-38 supra and
accompanying text. See also 1976 Hearings, supra note 3, at 99 (testimony of Michael M. Cohen).
174. 43 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 896 (1931).
175. Id. at 706.
176. Id. at 708 (quoting Pam-to-pee v. United States, 187 U.S. 371. 383 (1902)).
177. 43 F.2d at 708. However, at least one commentator has noted that this is not the case in
international practice. 'flIf it is true that courts usually grant immunity from execution, the
exceptions, while not very numerous, are today sufficiently frequent to make it doubtful that
there exists a real rule in the matter." Sweeney, supra note 13, at vii (quoting 84 Recueil des
Cours 205, 275 (1953)). See also Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States § 69 (1965). Notwithstanding that international practice was to the contrary, United States
courts continued to apply the Dexter rule of absolute immunity from execution. See New York &
Cuba Mail S.S. Co. v. Republic of Korea, 132 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Bradford v. Chase
Nat'l Bank, 24 F. Supp. 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1938), aff'd sub nom. Berger v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 105
F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1939), affld mere., 309 U.S. 632 (1940); Weilamann v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, 21 Misc. 2d 1086, 192 N.Y.S.2d 469 (Sup. Ct. 1959). Adherence to Dexter had the effect of
rendering the restrictive theory of immunity, the basis of which was that a foreign state was
accountable for its commercial obligations, completely illusory. This result was vigorously, and
justifiably, criticized. "Blind adherence to the doctrine of immunity from execution is an
anachronism having no place in either American law or foreign policy. The desire to permit
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A small minority of lower courts subsequently developed exceptions to the
general rule of immunity from execution. S.T. Tringali Co. v. The Tug Pemex
XV 178 is illustrative. There the property of a government-owned corporation
was not considered as being owned by a foreign sovereign, and therefore,
execution was permitted. 179 Another example is United States v. Harris &
Co. Advertising180 in which the court declined to recognize a plea of immunity
from execution, where the plea was filed after the conclusion of the execution
sales, and the chattels of the foreign government had gone beyond the control
of the court. 181
Notwithstanding these limited exceptions, the doctrine that the property of
a foreign sovereign was immune from execution rested on a practical doctrinal
basis. "[T]he idea of a sheriff or marshall actually impounding a foreign state's
property really does affront conceptions of friendly intercourse among
states."' 82 Moreover, recurring execution on the available assets of foreign
states might well discourage them from purchasing foreign missions or foreign
reserve exchanges in the United States.' 83
The Act attempts to compromise between the two evils of leaving the
prevailing litigant with a legally useless judgment and executing upon the
assets of a foreign state to the serious detriment of good international rela-
tions. 184 In the same fashion as the Act treats jurisdictional immunities
discussed earlier,18 5 it couches immunity from execution as the general
rule,' 8 6 and then creates exceptions to this general rule of immunity.18 7
redress for wrongs committed by foreign states-a desire which provided the impetus for
adoption of the restrictive doctrine in the first place-is thwarted when execution is denied."
Note, Sovereign Immunity of States Engaged in Commercial Activities, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1086,
1095 (1965).
178. 274 F. Supp. 227 (S.D. Tex. 1967).
179. Id. at 230; see discussion at notes 93-95 supra and accompanying text. See also Flota
Maritima Browning de Cuba, S.A. v. Motor Vessel Ciudad de la Habana, 335 F.2d 619 (4th Cir.
1964).
180. 149 So. 2d 384 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
181. Id. at 385-86.
182. Lowenfeld, Claims Against Foreign States-A Proposal for Reform of United States
Law, 44 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 901, 927-28 (1968).
183. Id. at 929.
184. New Departures, supra note 31, at 186 (remark:; of M. Belman).
185. See notes 46-47 supra and accompanying text.
186. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1609 (West Supp. 1977). The immunity provided in § 1609 is "(slubject to
existing international agreements to which the United States is a party . . . ." Id.; see, e.g.,
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards, T.I.A.S. No.
6997, reprinted in 53 Am. J. Int'l L. 420 (1959).
187. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1610 (West Supp. 1977). The House Report, supra note 4, notes the
international trend toward limiting the rule of immunity from execution, The United States has
negotiated many treaties which permit execution of judgments against foreign publicly owned and
controlled enterprises. See, e.g., Treaty with Japan, April 2, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No.
2863. The United States is a party to the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, which recognizes, under
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
The Act modifies the rule of absolute immunity promulgated in Dexter &
Carpenter Inc. v. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen8 8 by creating certain circum-
stances under which property of a foreign state which is used for commercial
activity in the United States will not be immune from execution. 89 In this
regard, the Act is consistent with the clear weight of authority in international
practice.190 While there is no doubt that a foreign state may claim immunity
from execution, the immunity wil be granted only when execution is sought
with respect to assets that the state holds as sovereign. Examples of such
immunized assets would be military property' 9 1 or funds earmarked by the
foreign state for such organizations as the International Monetary Fund or the
World Bank. 19 2 However, where a foreign state holds assets for use in
connection with commercial undertakings, the assets are not immune from
execution. 1
93
Under the Act, even when the property of a foreign state is used for
commercial activity, it will be immune from execution unless the property "is
or was used"' 9 4 for the commercial activity upon which the claim is based.
Thus, property of a foreign state that is unrelated to the claim is immune from
execution. For example, assume that a private citizen enters into a contract
with a foreign state. The foreign state breaches the contract, and the plaintiff
sues, and is awarded a judgment. Plaintiff seeks to collect the judgment by
the appropriate circumstances, the liability to execution of state-owned vessels used in commer-
cial service. House Report, supra note 4, at 6626.
188. 43 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 896 (1931); see notes 174-77 supra and
accompanying text.
189. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1610(a)(1)-(5) (Vest Supp. 1977).
190. See Sweeney, supra note 13, at 46-51.
191. The Act specifically provides that property of a military character is immune from
execution. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1611(b)(2) (West Supp. 1977). This will eliminate the possibility of
embarrassment to the United States resulting from the execution upon military equipment that
has been purchased here by a foreign state. See Sklaver, Sovereign Immunity in the United
States: An Analysis of S. 566, 8 Intl Law. 408, 423 (1974). This exemption pertaining to military
equipment also serves United States policy with respect to the sale of such equipment to foreign
governments. House Report, supra note 4, at 6630. It should be noted that § 1611 also exempts
central bank funds. Central bank funds would encompass funds held by the foreign state on its
own account, not to be used in connection with commercial activities. House Report, supra note
4, at 6630. The purpose of this exemption is "to encourage the holding of dollars in the United
States by foreign states, particularly when we have an adverse balance of payments." Sklaver,
Sovereign Immunity in the United States: An Analysis of S. 566, 8 Int'l Law. 408, 422-23 (1974).
192. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are designated by the President
of the United States under the International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288
(1970). These organizations have been traditionally considered immune from attachment and
execution. See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, art. IX,
§ 3, 60 Stat. 1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1501.
193. Sweeney, supra note 13, at 47 (quoting Egyptian Delta Rice Mills v. Comisaria General
de Abasteciminentos y Transportes de Madrid, 12 Ann. Dig. 103, 104 (1943).
194. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1610(a)(2) (West Supp. 1977). The language "is or was used" is designed
to prevent a situation where property is transferred from the commercial activity which is the
subject of the suit in order to avoid the process of the court. House Report, supra note 4. at 6627.
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attaching defendant's bank account in New York City. The plaintiff will not
be able to execute upon the assets in the account unless he can prove that the
assets were being used for a commercial activity and that the assets are or
were being used in connection with the very transaction sued upon. The
rationale is that execution upon the assets of a foreign state may be a source of
irritation, and that therefore, execution should not extend to property not
directly involved in the dispute. Moreover, in the hypothetical described
above, should execution become available on a large scale basis, the use of
United States depositories for foreign funds might well be discouraged.
The Act is considerably more liberal with respect to execution upon the
assets of an agency or an instrumentality of a foreign state. This reflects an
idea implicit in the Act's treatment of agencies or instrumentalities, namely,
that they are analogous to the corporate parent-subsidiary relationship, with
the instrumentality exercising a degree of autonomy and independence from
the controlling foreign state.1 95 Therefore, when an agency or instrumentality
engages in commercial activity in the United States, execution is available
upon any of its assets whether or not such assets are being used in connection
with the commercial activity upon which the claim is based. 19 6 Thus, in the
hypothetical above,197 a plaintiff awarded a judgment against an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state, could execute upon any of its assets, even if
it was engaged in more than one commercial activity. 198 The availability of
execution is of great benefit to private individuals who transact business with
foreign states, as it places the parties on an equal footing should litigation
arise. ' 99
Under the Act, a foreign state20 0 may also waive immunity from execu-
tion. 20 1 As in the section of the Act dealing with waiver of sovereign immu-
nity, 20 2 a foreign state may waive immunity from execution by explicit or
implied waiver. 2 3 Therefore, waiver for purposes of execution is governed by
195. See note 4 supra.
196. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1610(b) (West Supp. 1977).
197. See note 194 supra and accompanying text.
198. The House Report states that § 1610(b) does not permit execution against the property of
one agency or instrumentality to satisfy a judgment against an unrelated agency or instrumental-
ity. House Report, supra note 4, at 6628. The courts will have to determine on a case-by-case
basis whether property subject to execution is property "of" that agency or instrumentality. There
are practical political reasons for such a rule stemming from the fact that disregard of the
autonomy of separate agencies or instrumentalities could encourage foreign states to ignore the
independence of United States corporations and their autonomous subsidiaries. Id. at 6628-29.
199. For instance, prior to the passage of the Act, an agency or instrumentality could bring an
action against a private individual, secure in the knowledge that it was virtually immune from
judgment on any counterclaims that the defendant prevailed upon. See, e.g., Dexter & Car-
penter, Inc. v. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen, 43 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 896
(1931); notes 174-77 supra and accompanying text.
200. Foreign state is used here to include the foreign state itself, its political subdivisions, and
its agencies or instrumentalities. See note 4 supra.
201. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1610(a)(1) (West Supp. 1977).
202. Id. § 1605(a)(1); see notes 71-75 supra and accompanying text.
203. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1610(a)(1) (West Supp. 1977).
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the same principles as those which govern the waiver of sovereign immunity.
A waiver may be explicitly contained in the form of a treaty or contract,20 4 or
implied by the failure to raise a defense of immunity until after execution sales
have commenced. 20 5 In the interest of convenience, parties who secure an
explicit waiver of sovereign immunity from a foreign state should also include
a provision regarding waiver of immunity from execution.
The Act also permits execution against obligations owed to a foreign state
under a policy of liability insurance. 20 6 This provision was included for the
benefit of individuals awarded judgments as a result of motor vehicle acci-
dents with vehicles operated by the officials of a foreign state or its employ-
ees. 20 7 This is a common sense approach. Since the purpose of liability
insurance is to satisfy judgments awarded against the holder it is clear that a
foreign state should not be offended by execution against such obligations.
While the provisions on execution represent significant improvement over
the situation that existed at common law, 20 8 they are not without imperfec-
tion. Unless the foreign state has given an explicit waiver, there is no provi-
sion in the Act affording litigants the device of "protective attachment." Such
a device would prevent a foreign state from removing its assets beyond the
territorial jurisdiction of the court during the pendency of the action, in order
to avoid satisfaction of a judgment.20 9 As a practical matter, those foreign
states conducting a large volume of business in the United States will not
remove their assets in such a manner, because American firms could respond
by ceasing to transact business with them. However, it has been suggested
that such a protective device should be enacted if experience under the Act
indicates that foreign states are using the hiatus between commencement of an
action and entry of a judgment to remove assets, otherwise subject to execu-
tion, in order to frustrate the collection of judgments. 2t0
VII. REMEDIES UNDER THE AcT
Under the Act, where a foreign state is not immune from jurisdiction, its
liability exists in the same manner as that of a private citizen. Thus, in the
appropriate circumstances, a court could grant injunctive relief against, or
require specific performance by a foreign state. The ability of a court to act in
204. House Report, supra note 4, at 6627. See also notes 71-73 supra and accompanying text.
205. See, e.g., United States v. Harris & Co. Advertising, Inc., 149 So. 2d 384 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1963), discussed at notes 180-81 supra and accompanying texL
206. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1610(a)(5) (West Supp. 1977).
207. House Report, supra note 4, at 6628; see notes 85-88 supra and accompanying text.
208. See notes 169-73 supra and accompanying text.
209. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. Prac. § 6201 (McKinney Supp. 1977). as amended by ch. 860, 1977
N.Y. Laws, for an example of a statute affording the device of protective attachment. 28
U.S.C.A. § 1610(d) (West Supp. 1977) allows attachment as a provisional remedy where there is
an explicit waiver, as long as the purpose of the attachment is to secure satisfaction of a judgment
that may be awarded and not to secure jurisdiction.
210. See Letter of the Comm. on Intl Law of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York,
reprinted in 1976 Hearings, supra note 3, at 72, 76.
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such a manner, would not, however, be dispositive of its ability to enforce
such orders. For example, suppose a foreign state, through the discharge of
environmental pollutants within its own territory, had damaged a body of
water in this country, in violation of an applicable United States law. If this
were the result of commercial activity, that state would certainly be amenable
to suit under the Act.2 1 I Assume further that a class action, seeking compen-
satory damages and an injunction, was commenced against the foreign state.
While the Act does not address the propriety of maintaining class actions
against foreign states, it is suggested that to the extent that the Act treats the
foreign state as a private citizen, class actions should be available. A court
could certainly award compensatory damages or order an injunction. 2 12 How-
ever, where the foreign state involved has no available assets, or where the
available assets are immune, 2 13 collection of damages would seem doubtful.
Moreover, should the foreign state simply choose to ignore the injunction or
an order of contempt ensuing therefrom, the court would be powerless, under
the Act, to proceed any further. While this hypothetical is an extreme case, it
does indicate that the problems in this area are complex and that the avail-
ability of remedies means little without the power to enforce them.
It should also be noted that, under the Act, a foreign state will not be liable
for punitive damages for its tortious acts or omissions.2 14 This is in accor-
dance with international practice, 21 - and reflects the notion that a sovereign
should not be imputed with malice, a traditional predicate to the availability
of punitive damages. Moreover, "the people of the state as a whole should not
be charged with additional damages for a wrong . . . of which they had
neither knowledge nor wrongful intent."2 1 6
Plaintiffs seeking discovery against a foreign state should note that while
the appropriate remedies under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure are available for an unjustifiable failure to make discovery, the concept
of governmental privilege may be applicable where discovery involves the
sensitive documents of a foreign state.2 1 7 Thus, where a foreign state is able
to convince a court that, due to the circumstances of the case, there is a
reasonable danger that discovery could imperil its national security, the
privilege should apply.2 18 The rationale behind the privilege is that "govern-
211. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(2) (West Supp. 1977).
212. See House Report, supra note 4, at 6621.
213. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1609, 1611 (West Supp. 1977); see note 191 supra.
214. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1606 (West Supp. 1977).
215. See 5 G. Hackworth, Digest of International Law 723-26 (1946).
216. Id. at 724-25 (quoting I. Whiteman, Damages in International Law 717 (1937)).
217. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970), which provides for certain governmental information
that would not be subject to discovery. This privilege would be extended, by analogy, to foreign
states.
218. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). There the Court stated that
"there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters which,
in the interest of national security, should not be divulged. When this is the case, the occasion for
the privilege is appropriate, and the court should not jeopardize the security which the privilege is
meant to protect by insisting upon an examination of the evidence, even by the judge alone, In
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ment... needs open but protected channels for the kind of plain talk that is
essential to the quality of its functioning." 21 9
This could be a controversial area. For instance, a suit against an agency of
a foreign state for a violation of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 could entail extensive discovery. Such discovery could become an explo-
sive issue, if what is sought are sensitive documents containing discussion of
governmental or political rationale behind the activities leading to the alleged
violation. For instance, suppose an agency of a foreign state had intimate
knowledge of an impending coup d'etat or political assassination which could
effect the viability of securities which it had issued or owned. The courts have
traditionally exercised a great deal of discretion in dealing with such matters.
For example, in Ticon Corp. v. Emerson Radio & Phonograph Corp.,220
defendant, who had contracted with the United States Army for the manufac-
ture of arming mechanisms, was sued by his subcontractor. The defendant
moved to dismiss the action on the ground that its prosecution would require
disclosure of classified information. The court denied the motion, but advised
the parties that at the appropriate time, it would take measures to insure that
national security would not be endangered. 221 It is suggested that discovery
should be strictly limited where a suggestion of governmental or diplomatic
privilege is raised. Of course, where the cause of action arises out of the
purely commercial activities of a foreign state,2 2 2 discovery should proceed as
it would against a private individual.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Justice Holmes once justified the theory of sovereign immunity by stating
that "[a] sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception
or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be
no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends. '2 23 Perhaps Blackstone had the better argument when he wrote that
the immunity of a sovereign state from suit "stretcheth not to the doing of any
wrong."2 24 The Immunities Act is really just an extension of Blackstone's
logic. It seeks to treat the foreign state as a private citizen only where the
foreign state has engaged in wrongdoing. As such, the Act is both a legal and
a moral necessity. 22 5
chambers." Id. at 10. See also Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1876). There the plaintiff
had entered into a contract with President Lincoln to perform espionage behind the Confederate
lines. Plaintiff's action was dismissed on the pleadings, as the Court concluded that the disclosure
of the existence of the contract itself could expose state secrets. Id. at 106-07.
219. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 325 (D.D.C. 1966), offd,
384 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967).
220. 206 Mlisc. 727, 134 N.Y.S.2d 716 (Sup. CL 1954).
221. Id. at 733, 134 N.Y.S.2d at 722.
222. See notes 57-61 supra and accompanying text.
223. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) (citation omitted).
224. 1. W. Blackstone, Commentaries *238.
225. See Reeves, The Foreign Sovereign Before United States Courts, 38 Fordham L Rev.
455, 496 (1970).
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The drafters have done an admirable job. They have sought to protect the
conflicting interests of the foreign state in preserving its essential sovereignty
and the private litigant seeking judicial review of his claim. The courts, while
proceeding cautiously in this politically sensitive area,226 should nevertheless
be vigilant in assuring that litigants are afforded what is really the crucial
lynchpin of the Act: a day in court.
Kevin P. Simmons
226. It is evident that the judiciary may have to take into account potential sensitivities
lurking behind an action. In this regard, while the amicus curiae briefs that may be submitted by
the State Department in a particular action should be scrutinized with great care, any undue
judicial deference toward State Department desires would violate the Act's express Intent of
removing State Department involvement in this area.
